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Review of Selected 1990 California
Legislation--Addendum
Proposition 115: The Crime Victims
Justice Reform Act
Criminal Procedure--Crime Victims Justice Reform Act
California Constitution, Art. I, §§ 14.1, 29, 30 (new); Penal Code
§§ 1102.5, 1102.7, 1430 (repealed); §§ 190.41, 206, 206.1, 871.6,
964.1, 987.05, 1049.5, 1050.1, 1054, 1054.1, 1054.2, 1054.3,
1054.4, 1054.5, 1054.6, 1054.7, 1385.1, 1511 (new); §§ 189, 190.2,
190.5, 859, 866, 872 (amended); Civil Procedure Code § 223
(repealed and new); § 223.5 (repealed); Evidence Code § 1203.1
(new).
Proposition 115*
Support: Governor Pete Wilson; California District Attorneys
Association; California Peace Officer's Association; California
Police Chief's Association; California Correctional Peace Officers
Association; Women Prosecutors of California; William Plested Im,
M.D., President, California Medical Association.
Opposition: Robin Schneider, Executive Director, California
Abortion Rights Action League; Shirley Hufstedler; W. Benson
Harer, Jr., M.D., Chair, District 9, American College of OB-GYN;
William Robertson, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Los Angeles
County Federation of Labor; Linda Tangren, State Chair, National
Women's Political Caucus.
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* Proposition 115 was enacted by a vote of the California electorate on June 5, 1990.
INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 1990, the California electorate passed Proposition
115, an initiative popularly known as the Crime Victims Justice
Reform Act.' This analysis will describe the various statutory and
constitutional changes made by Proposition 115,2 and will discuss
the California Supreme Court's decision in Raven v. Deulknejian,
3
which addressed two issues posed by this initiative.4 Other
challenges, not addressed in Raven, but discussed by the California
Court of Appeal in Nollins v. Superior Court5 will also be
reviewed.6 Finally, the provision of Proposition 115 mandating
reciprocal discovery in criminal trials and its susceptibility to a
confrontation clause challenge is considered.7
THE PROVISIONS OF PROPOSITION 115
A. Limitation of Defendants' Rights
Existing law states that the rights guaranteed by the California
constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the federal
1. See Proposition 115, § 1(d). In 1982, the California electorate passed another initiative,
Proposition 8, that was intended to aid crime victims and strengthen the criminal justice system. See
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. Among other things, Proposition 8 required any law which excluded
relevant evidence in a criminal trial to be enacted by a two-thirds vote of each house of the California
Legislature. Id. art. I, § 28(d). Other states have passed 'victims of crime" statutes. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31-24-1 - 31-24-7 (crime victims' and witnesses' bill of rights); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23
(rights of crime victims); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (rights of crime victims). See generally
CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JusTIcE, STATE TASK FORCE ON VICTIMs' RIGHTS (1988)
(discussion of the difficulties encountered by crime victims in California's criminal justice system,
and recommendations as to how these problems can be alleviated).
2. See infra notes 8-129 and accompanying text.
3. - Cal. 3d -, - P.2d -, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990). At the time of publication deadline
for this issue of the Pacific Law Journal, only the West's California Reporter opinion had been
published. Consequently, subsequent references to the Raven case will cite only the West's California
Reporter opinion.
4. See infra notes 134-165 and accompanying text.
5. 224 Cal. App. 3d 1171, 274 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1990).
6. See infra notes 166-185 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 186-197 and accompanying text.
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Constitution.8 Proposition 115 attempted to narrow some of
California's constitutional protections by providing that the rights
of criminal defendants under the California constitution be no
greater than those afforded by the United States Constitution.' This
provision was invalidated by the California Supreme Court in
Raven, 0 and will be discussed in the comment below.11
B. New Crime of Torture
Proposition 115 creates the crime of torture." Torture is
defined as the infliction of great bodily injury13 with the intent to
cause cruel or extreme suffering for sadistic, retaliatory, coercive,
or extortionary purposes. 4 The prosecution is not required to
prove that the victim suffered any pain in order to obtain a torture
conviction."5 The punishment for torture is life imprisonment.16
This provision of Proposition 115 was apparently created in
response to People v. Singleton," in which the defendant,
Lawrence Singleton, chopped off the hands of a young girl whom
he had raped and sodomized."8 For this act, Singleton was
charged and convicted of mayhem 9 and several other crimes.2"
8. CAL. CoNsT. art. I., § 24.
9. Proposition 115, § 3.
10. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
11. See infra notes 151-165 and accompanying text.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (enacted by Proposition 115).
13. "'Great bodily injury" is defimed as a significant or substantial physical injury. Id. §
12022.7 (West 1982).
14. Id. § 206 (enacted by Proposition 115). If a death results from the commission of this crime,
the death penalty may be imposed. Id. § 190.2(a)(18) (amended by Proposition 115). See infra notes
41-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of California's death penalty law, and changes made
thereto by Proposition 115.
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (enacted by Proposition 115).
16. Id. § 206.1 (enacted by Proposition 115).
17. 112 Cal. App. 3d 418, 169 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1980).
18. Id. at 421-22, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
19. Mayhem is the dismembering, disfiguring, or rendering useless of a limb of the body, or
the cutting or disabling of the tongue, eye, ear, lip, or nose. CAL. PENAL CODE § 203 (West Supp.
1991). Additionally, California law recognizes the crime of aggravated mayhem. Id. § 205 (West
1988).
20. Singleton, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 420-21, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 334. Singleton was also convicted
of rape, forcible oral copulation, kidnapping, sodomy, and attempted murder. Id., 112 Cal. App. 3d
at 420-21, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
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The maximum penalty for mayhem is eight years in prison.2
Public outcry over Singleton's sentence of fourteen and one-third
years,22 and the circumstances of his parole, prompted the creation
of this crime.2'
C. First Degree Murder
Proposition 115 expands the definition of first degree murder.24
Existing law recognizes that murders perpetrated by specific
methods,' occurring during the course of certain crimes,26 or
murders that were willful, deliberate, and premeditated,27 are first
degree murders.28  Proposition 115 provides that murders
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 204 (West 1988).
22. Singleton, 112 Cal. App.3d at 421, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 334. Singleton's sentence for the
mayhem conviction was stayed pending completion of his sentences for his other convictions. Id.
Singleton received a sentence of ten years for the attempted murder, two years for forcible oral
copulation, one year for sodomy, and one and one-third years for rape. Id.
23. Argument in Favor of Proposition 115, reprinted in JUNE 1990 BALLOT PAMPHLET at 34.
See also CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE COMMrEE ON JUDICIARY, ASSEMBLY COMMrrirE ON
PuBLIc SAFETY, JOINT HEARING ON CRIME VICTIMS JUSTICE REFORM ACT (hereinafter JoINT
HEARING), part 3, at 005 (new crime of torture included as part of Proposition 115 to insure that
crimes such as Singleton's receive a minimum punishment of life imprisonment). Singleton's release
on parole, after having served only half of his sentence, sparked mobs in the towns in which he
attempted to reside immediately following his release. Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1987, at 3, col.
I.
24. CAl. PENAL CODE § 189 (amended by Proposition 115) (definition of first degree murder).
25. The methods specified include poison, use of a destructive device or explosive, lying in
wait, knowing use of ammunition designed to penetrate metal, and torture. See id.
26. The crimes specified include arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, and lewd and
lascivious acts performed with a child under the age of 14. See id.
27. See People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 26-27, 447 P.2d 942, 949, 73 Cal. Rptr 550, 557,
(1968) (deliberation and premeditation can be established by offering evidence of the defendant's
planning activity prior to the crime, his motive for committing the crime, and a manner of killing
which leads to an inference that the killing was planned). See also People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333,
347-50,729 P.2d 802, 810-12,233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 375-77, (1987); People v. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d 543,
555-57, 749 P.2d 776, 781-82, 244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 126-27, (1988) (recent applications of the
Anderson test). In Bloyd, the nature of the killings-the victims were shot in an execution-like manner
at pointblank range-was the basis for proving deliberation and premeditation. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d at
347-48, 729 P.2d at 810-11, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 375-76. In Hovey, the defendant kidnapped an eight
year old girl, molested her, and repeatedly stabbed her after her blindfold slipped off. Hovey, 44 Cal.
3d at 554-55,749 P.2d at 780-41,244 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26. The court held that these facts established
sufficient evidence of planning activity, motive, and a method of killing sufficient to satisfy the
Anderson test. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 555-56, 749 P.2d at 781-82, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (amended by Proposition 115). All other murders are second-
degree murders. Id.
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committed during the course of a kidnapping,29 trainwrecking, °
sodomy,31 oral copulation,32 lewd and lascivious acts with a
child under the age of 14," or penetration of genital or anal
openings by a foreign object' are first degree murders.35
Under existing law, the penalty for first degree murder is death,
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or a term of
twenty-five years to life in prison.3" Existing law also provides
that the death penalty may not be imposed on a defendant who was
under the age of eighteen at the time the crime was committed.37
Additionally, existing law requires the jury to consider the age of
the defendant at the time of the murder when determining the
penalty for first degree murder.38
Former case law held that a person who was under the age
of eighteen at the time he or she committed first degree murder
could not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole.39 Proposition 115 states that a person convicted of first
degree murder who was sixteen or seventeen years old at the time
29. See id. § 207 (West 1988) (definition of kidnapping).
30. See id. § 219 (West 1988) (definition of trainwrecking).
31. See id. § 286(a) (West Supp. 1991) (definition of sodomy).
32. See id. § 288a (West Supp. 1991) (definition of oral copulation).
33. lId § 288 (West Supp. 1991) (defn-ition of lewd and lascivious acts committed upon a child
under the age of fourteen).
34. See id. § 289 (West Supp. 1991) (definition of the penetration of genital or anal openings
by a foreign object).
35. Id. § 189 (amended by Proposition 115).
36. Id. § 190(a) (West Supp. 1991).
37. Id. § 190.5(a) (amended by Proposition 115). The eighth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution does not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on persons who were 16 or 17
years old at the time that they committed capital crimes. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S.Ct. 2969,2980
(1989). However, the execution of persons who were under the age of 16 at the time they committed
a crime is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment. Thompson v.
Oldahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). The eighth amendment is made applicable to the states via the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1961). See
also Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462-63 (1946) (Court presumed that eight amendment
violations would also violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.05(h)(9) (West 1988).
39. People v. Spears, 33 Cal. 3d 279, 283, 655 P.2d 1289, 1292, 188 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457. See
also People v. Davis, 29 Cal. 3d 814, 827-32, 633 P.2d 186, 193-96, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521, 528-31,
(1981) (holding that the death penalty law then in force did not authorize the imposition of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole on a defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time
the crime was committed).
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of the murder must be sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole if any special circumstances have been found
to exist that would warrant the death penalty. 40 However, the
court may, in its discretion, impose a sentence of twenty-five years
to life imprisonment.4'
D. The Death Penalty
Under existing law, a court may impose the death penalty if the
defendant is found guilty of first degree murder, and one or more
special circumstances are found to exist.42 If the murder was
committed during the course of specific crimes, a special
circumstance exists that justifies capital punishment.43 Under
Proposition 115, mayhem and penetration of an anal or genital
opening by a foreign instrument are crimes constituting special
circumstances for purposes of imposing the death penalty.' Prior
law allowed the death penalty for intentional murders involving the
infliction of torture, if there was proof the victim suffered extreme
physical pain.45 Under Proposition 115, the prosecution need not
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(b) (enacted by Proposition 115).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 190.2(a) (amended by Proposition 115). The death penalty is not per se cruel and
unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-87 (1976). However, to pass constitutional
muster a state's death penalty laws must not permit the judge or jury unbridled discretion in their
decision whether or not to sentence the defendant to death. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253-55
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). Furthermore, a mandatory death penalty is unconstitutional.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 296-305 (1976). For a brief discussion of the history of
capital punishment up to the Furman decision, see HOOK & KAHN, DEATH iN THE BALANCE: THE
DEBATE OVER CAPrrAL PuNIsHmENT at 11-28 (1989). See also VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, THE
DEATi PENALTY: A DEBATE (1983) (presenting arguments in favor of and opposing capital
punishment).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE. § 190.2(a)(17) (amended by Proposition 115). The crimes included are
robbery, kidnapping, rape, sodomy, lewd and lakcivious acts performed on a child under the age of
14, oral copulation, burglary, arson, and trainwrecking. Id. This provision also applies if the defendant
was an accomplice in the commission of one of these crimes. Id.
44. Id. (amended by Proposition 115). Prior law required that any special circumstances be
charged and specially found to be true. Initiative Measure approved November 7,1978, § 6 (enacting
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)) (amended by Proposition 115). Under Proposition 115 a special
circumstance need not be charged. Id. § 190.2(a)(18) (amended by Proposition 115).
45. Initiative Measure approved November 7, 1978, § 6 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(a)(18)) (amended by Proposition 115).
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prove the infliction of extreme physical pain in order to obtain a
death sentence.46
Existing law permits the imposition of the death penalty against
a person convicted of intentionally aiding and abetting a murder
who did not actually kill the victim.47 However, prior case law
held that capital punishment could not be imposed on a defendant
convicted of felony-murder absent a finding that the defendant had
an intent to kill.48 Proposition 115 permits capital punishment to
be imposed on a defendant who is not the actual killer if the
defendant was a "major participant" in a felony resulting in a
person's death, and the defendant acted with reckless49
indifference to human life."
Existing law permits a judge or magistrate to order an action
dismissed on his or her own motion or upon application of the
prosecutor.5 Prior case law held that a finding of special
circumstances in a capital case could be dismissed by the judge
pursuant to this law.52 Proposition 115 prohibits a judge from
striking a special circumstance that is admitted by a guilty plea,
found to be true by a jury, or admitted by a plea of no contest.53
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18) (amended by Proposition 115).
47. Id. § 190.2(b)-(c) (enacted by Proposition 115).
48. Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 153-54, 672 P.2d 862, 877, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79,
94-95 (1983).
49. A person acts recklessly if he or she acts with conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk, behaving in a manner that represents a gross deviation from the conduct of a law-
abiding person. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
50. Id. § 190.2(d) (amended by Proposition 115). The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that a statute permitting a defendant to be executed, absent evidence that the defendant had
killed, intended to kill, or contemplated that human life would be taken was unconstitutional. Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). However, this holding was limited in the case of Thson v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987). In Tson, the Court held that a major participant in a felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life may be subject to capital punishment. Id. at 158.
51. CAL PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (West Supp. 1991). Dismissal of an action pursuant to this
section must be in the interests of justice. Id. However, a judge may not strike a prior felony
conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement. Id. § 1385(b) (West Supp. 1991).
52. People v. Williams, 30 Cal. 3d 470,477-90, 637 P.2d 1029, 1032-40, 179 Cal. Rptr. 443,
446-54 (1981).
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385.1 (enacted by Proposition 115).
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Prior case law required the corpus delicti54 of a felony-based
special circumstance justifying the imposition of the death penalty
to be proven independently of the defendant's extrajudicial
confession.55 Proposition 115 states that the corpus delicti of a
felony-based special circumstance need not be proven
independently of the defendant's extrajudicial confession.56
E. Voir Dire
Prior law allowed attorneys to conduct voir dire in criminal
cases.57  Proposition 115 requires the judge to conduct the
examination of jurors in a criminal case.58 However, upon a
showing of good cause, the court has the discretion to permit the
attorneys to examine the prospective jurors, or to ask the jurors
questions that the attorneys have submitted.59
Prior case law required that the voir dire of jurors be conducted
individually and in sequestration when that voir dire concerned
capital punishment.' Under Proposition 115, voir dire, including
voir dire in capital cases, is to occur in the presence of other jurors,
whenever practicable.6
Prior law permitted an attorneys' examination of venirepersons
in order to enable counsel to make intelligent decisions regarding
the use of peremptory challenges.62 Proposition 115 permits the
54. The corpus delicti of a crime refers to the elements comprising the crime, usually specific
acts combined with criminal intent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (5th ed. 1979).
55. People v. Mattson, 37 Cal. 3d 85,93-94,688 P.2d 887, 891-92, 207 Cal. Rptr. 278,282-83
(1984).
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.41 (enacted by Proposition 115). This provision applies
notwithstanding Penal Code section 190.4, which requires that a special circumstance must be
charged and proved according to the general law. See id. § 190.4 (West 1988).
57. 1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1245, sec. 2, at 3153 (West) (enacting CAL CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 223) (repealed and re-enacted by Proposition 115).
58. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (enacted by Proposition 115).
59. Id.
60. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 80-81,616 P.2d 1301, 1354-55, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128,
181-82 (1980).
61. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (re-enacted by Proposition 115).
62. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392,407,628 P.2d 869, 87677 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 324-25
(1981). The United States Constitution does not grant the defendant the right to a peremptory
challenge. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1919). However, although the prosecutor
1017
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examination of jurors by attorneys only to aid in challenges for
cause.
63
Prior case law stated that the improper exercise of peremptory
challenges, and a court's failure to evaluate the explanations
offered by a prosecutor to justify the exclusion of a juror, was error
per se, and required the reversal of a conviction." Proposition 115
states that abuse of the court's discretion in conducting voir dire
will lead to a reversal of a conviction only if the abuse of
discretion results in a miscarriage of justice.65
F. Postindictment Preliminary Hearings
In California, a criminal prosecution begins when the prosecutor
files an information, an indictment is filed, the case is brought
before the court by complaint or certification, or a warrant is
issued.66 Prior case law required that a criminal defendant be
granted a postindictment preliminary hearing.67 Proposition 115
may exercise his or her peremptory challenges for any reason related to the outcome of the case, the
equal protection clause prohibits the prosecutor from using those challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). The Batson Court did not
address the issue of whether the Constitution placed any such limitations on the defendant. Id. at 89,
n. 12. See Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASTINOS
LJ. 1195 (1987) (general review of the use of peremptory challenges and the effects of the Batson
case).
63. CAI. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (re-enacted by Proposition 115). A challenge is an objection
made to trial jurors or prospective jurors. Id. § 225(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1991). Challenges for cause
made to prospective jurors may be made on the basis of general disqualification, implied bias, or
actual bias. Id. § 225(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991). See id. §§ 228 (West Supp. 1991) (grounds for
general disqualification); 229 (Vest Supp. 1991) (definition of implied bias); 225(b)(1)(C) (Vest
Supp. 1991) (definition of actual bias).
64. People v. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711,728,726 P.2d 102, 112,230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 666 (1986);
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 283, 583 P.2d 748, 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 907 (1978).
65. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 223 (re-enacted by Proposition 115). A "miscarriage of justice"
exists where there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the appealing party would have
received a more favorable result. People v. Williams, 13 Cal. 3d 559,563,531 P.2d 778, 780-81, 119
Cal. Rptr. 210, 212-13 (1975).
66. CAL PENAL CODE § 804 (West 1985).
67. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 584,593,586 P.2d 916,922, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435,441
(1978). The California Supreme Court reasoned in Hawkins that the denial of a postindictment
preliminary hearing was a denial of equal protection because of the traditional advantages the
prosecutor has at a grand jury indictment. Id. at 587-593, 586 P.2d at 917-22, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 436-
41. For a comparison of the grand jury indictment and preliminary hearing procedures, see Comment,
A Constitutional Right to Preliminary Hearings for All Pretrial Detainees, 48 S. CAL. L REv. 158,
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amends the California Constitution by eliminating postindictment
preliminary hearings in felony cases."
G. Speedy Trial
Proposition 115 amends the California Constitution by stating
that the people of California are entitled to due process of law and
a speedy trial in criminal cases.69 To implement this constitutional
mandate, Proposition 115 provides, first, that a felony trial must
begin within sixty days of the arraignment." Furthermore, the
court may appoint defense counsel if counsel assures the court that
he or she can be ready to proceed with the trial and pre-trial
proceedings within the statutory time period.71 If the defense
attorney represents that he or she will be ready within the statutory
time period, but is unprepared without good cause, the trial court
170-73 (1974). For a general review of California preliminary hearing practice, see SIMONS,
CALIFORNIA PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS AND 995 BENCHBOOK: STATUTES AND NOTES, (3d ed.
1989).
68. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.1 (enacted by Proposition 115). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e) (1982)
(in the federal court system, a preliminary hearing is not required if an information has been filed
or an indictment returned against the defendant).
69. CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 29 (enacted by Proposition 115). Additionally, a criminal defendant
has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right is made applicable to
the states via the fourteenth amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-26 (1967).
See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.514, 530-33 (1972) (establishing a balancing tst for determining
if a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988) (Speedy
Trial Act, which provides, among other things, the time limits within which an information or
indictment must be filed); FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) (allowing the trial judge to dismiss the indictment,
information, or complaint if there has been unnecessary delay); FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(a) (criminal trials
to receive preferential scheduling whenever possible). Additionally, California's constitution provides
a defendant with the right to a speedy trial. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. A defendant can establish that
he or she has been denied a speedy trial by showing that there has been an extended delay in
commencing trial. Barker v. Municipal Court, 64 Cal. 2d 806, 812, 415 P.2d 809, 813, 51 Cal. Rptr.
921, 925 (1966). The defendant need not show that he or she has been prejudiced by the delay to
succeed on this claim. Id. For a general discussion of the defendant's right to a speedy trial, see
generally Comment, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy and Public Trial, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1489 (1989).
70. CAL PENAL CODE § 1049.5 (enacted by Proposition 115). However, the superior court may
set the trial for a later date upon a showing of good cause Id.
71. Id. § 987.05 (enacted by Proposition 115). Exceptions can be made in unusual
circumstances. Id. Nevertheless, the court cannot consider counsel's schedule conflicts or convenience
when deciding whether or not an extension is warranted. Id. If an extension is granted, the defense
attorney is to be granted a reasonable time to prepare the case. Id.
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may impose sanctions, remove the attorney from the case, or
both.72 These enactments reflect the concern that court time was
being wasted, and delay in criminal proceedings created additional
difficulties for crime victims.73
H. Hearsay Evidence & Preliminary Hearing Procedures
Existing law prohibits the use of hearsay evidence74 unless
otherwise allowed by law.75 If hearsay evidence is admitted, the
declarant is generally subject to cross-examination.76 Prior law
allowed written hearsay statements to be admissible at a
preliminary hearing in lieu of testimony if the hearsay declarant
was not a eyewitness to the crime or a victim of a crime against
his or her person.7 7  However, prior law also permitted the
defendant to call the witness who made the hearsay statement for
72. Id. Both attorneys may present evidence as to what a reasonable time for preparation would
be, and as to what prevented the defense attorney from being prepared on time. Id.
73. JOINT HEARING, part 2, at 42 (1989). See also CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STATE TASK FORCE ON VICTIMs* RI'HTs at 11 (1988) (noting that the delays in the criminal justice
system adversely impact crime victims). One victim remarked that courtroom delays caused her to
miss several days of work, for which she remained uncompensated. Id. As the Task Force put it,
"Justice delayed is justice not served." Id. See generally Goldfarb, When Judges Abandon Analogy:
The Problem of Delay in Criminal Prosecutions, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 607 (1990) (general
discussion of trial delays and recommendations for increasing efficiency in criminal trials).
74. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966) (definition of hearsay). Cf. FED. R. EvID.
801(c) (definition of hearsay).
75. CAL EVID. CODE. § 1200(b) (West 1966). See FED. R. EvrD 802 (hearsay not admissible
except as otherwise provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the United States Supreme Court,
or Congress). Both the California and federal court systems recognize numerous exceptions to the
hearsay rule. See, e.g., CAL- EVID. CODE §§ 1240 (West 1966) (spontaneous statements); 1271 (West
1966) (business records); 1250 (West 1966) (statements pertaining to the declarant's then existing
mental or physical condition); FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (statements pertaining to a medical diagnosis or
treatment); 803(6) (records of regularly conducted activity); 803(11) (records of religious
organizations). See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 724-912 (3d ed.) (discussion of the hearsay
rule and its exceptions).
76. CAL- EVID. CODE § 1203(a) (West 1966). However, an admissible hearsay statement is not
made inadmissible because the declarant is unavailable for examination. Id. § 1203(d) (West 1966).
Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing specific exceptions to the hearsay rule which remain admissible
notwithstanding the declarant's availability as a witness).
77. 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 1026, sec. 1, at 3941-42 (amending CAL PENAL CODE § 872(b)
(amended by Proposition 115). Furthermore, this statement was inadmissable if the prosecutor failed
to furnish the defendant with a copy of the statement at least 10 days prior to the preliminary hearing.
Id. This written statement was required to be made under penalty of perjury. Id.
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cross-examination.78 The prosecutor was required to present the
witness for cross-examination by the defense if the defendant was
unable to locate the witness after making a reasonable effort, and
if the prosecution failed to produce the witness the hearsay
statement could not be considered as evidence in the preliminary
hearing.79 In Mills v. Superior Court,8" the California Supreme
Court held that this provision violated a defendant's rights under
the California Constitution.81  Proposition 115 amends the
California Constitution, and effectively overrules Mills, by making
hearsay evidence admissible at preliminary hearings.82
Prior case law stated that a defendant had a constitutional right
to cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing.83 Proposition
115 specifically permits the prosecuting attorney to establish
probable cause" with the hearsay testimony of a law enforcement
officer who is specially trained in the investigation and reporting
of cases.8 5 Under Proposition 115, this testimony is not subject to
cross-examination.
86
Generally, a defendant is permitted to call witnesses at a
preliminary hearing.87 Proposition 115 permits the magistrate,
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 42 Cal. 3d 951, 728 P.2d 211, 232 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986).
81. Id. at 959, 728 P.2d at 215-16, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
82. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(b) (enacted by Proposition 115). Cf FED. R. CRuM. P. 5.1(a) (the
finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing may be based in whole or in part on hearsay
evidence). Proposition 115 states that the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to establish if there is
probable cause that the defendant has committed a crime; preliminary hearings are not to be used for
purposes of discovery. CAL. PENAL CODE § 866(b) (amended by Proposition 115).
83. Mills, 42 Cal. 3d at 959, 728 P.2d at 216, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See also Jennings v.
Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 879,428 P.2d 304, 311,59 Cal. Rptr. 440,
447 (1967) (denial of cross-examination at a preliminary hearing constituted a denial of the
defendant's substantial rights).
84. Probable cause exists when the circumstances would lead a person of reasonable caution
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175-76 (1949).
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (amended by Proposition 115). The law enforcement officer
offering the hearsay testimony must either have completed training in the investigation and reporting
of cases, including testifying at preliminary hearings, or must have at least five years law enforcement
experience. Id.
86. CAL. EvlD. CODE § 1203.1 (enacted by Proposition 115).
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 866(a) (amended by Proposition 115). The defense witnesses are called
after the prosecution has finished examining its witnesses. Id.
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upon the request of the prosecutor, to require the defense attorney
to make an offer of proof showing that the testimony of the
defense witness, if believed, would be reasonably likely to negate
an element of the crime, establish an affirmative defense, or
impeach a prosecution witness."8
Existing law requires that the preliminary hearing be scheduled
within ten days of a defendant's arraignment or plea, whichever
occurs later.8 9 Proposition 115 further provides that, if the
magistrate sets the date of the preliminary hearing beyond this time
limit or grants a continuance of the preliminary hearing without
good cause 9 if good cause is required for a continuance, the
magistrate's decision shall be subject to immediate review in the
superior court.9'
Several aspects of the changes in the rules of evidence at
preliminary hearings were addressed by the California Court of
Appeal in Nollins v. Superior Court.9" Although the court of
appeal upheld the hearsay provisions of Proposition 115, an
examination of United States Supreme Court cases reveals
confrontation clause issues. This will be discussed in the comment
below.9
. Discovery and Pre-Trial Procedures
Prior law required the prosecuting attorney to deliver, or make
accessible, copies of a defendant's arrest and crime reports to the
88. Id.
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 859b (W, est. Supp. 1990). The preliminary hearing can be scheduled
at a later date if there is good cause for a continuance. Id.
90. The convenience of the parties does not by itself constitutes good cause. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1050(e) (West Supp. 1990). When determining if good cause exists, the court must consider the
convenience and prior commitments of tie witnesses in the case. Id. § 1050(g) (West Supp. 1990).
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 871.6 (enacted by Proposition 115). Review of the magistrate's
decision must be sought through a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Id. This petition
receives priority in the superior court. Id. If the superior court grants the writ, the writ must issue
within three days of the court's decision. Id.
92. 224 Cal. App. 3d 1171, 274 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1990).
93. See infra notes 166 - 185 and accompanying text.
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defendant or the defense attorney no later than the first court
appearance.94 Proposition 115 repeals this provision.95
Prior case law eliminated judicially-created prosecutorial
discovery. 96  Additionally, prior case law held that a statute
permitting the prosecution to discover prior statements of defense
witnesses other than the defendant was invalid under the provision
of the California Constitution granting the criminal defendant a
privilege against self-incrimination.97 Proposition 115 amends the
California constitution by permitting reciprocal discovery in
criminal cases.98 Furthermore, Proposition 115 adds Chapter 10 to
the California Penal Code.99 This Chapter enumerates the specific
items of evidence that the prosecution and defense must make
available upon request."
94. 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 877, sec. 1, at 2820-21 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 859) (amended
by Proposition 115).
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 859 (amended by Proposition 115).
96. People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 53-56, 634 P.2d 534, 539-41, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 463-65
(1981).
97. In Re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 558, 698 P.2d 637, 648, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 580 (1985).
This information was available to the prosecution after the defense witness had testified. Id. at 545,
698 P.2d at 638, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
98. CAL CONST. art. 1, § 30(c) (enacted by Proposition 115). Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(l)
(limiting prosecutorial discovery to specifically enumerated items; Id. 16(b)(2) (defense information
not subject to discovery). Reciprocal discovery in a criminal case refers to the prosecution's ability
to demand and receive disclosure of evidence if the defendant has first demanded, or had the right
to demand, evidence of the same general character as the evidence the prosecution is seeking. W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRiMINAL PROcEDuRE 746-47 (abr. ed. 1985). The defendant must be allowed
reciprocal discovery when the prosecution has initially demanded disclosure of evidence from the
defense. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474-79 (1973). However, reciprocal prosecutorial
discovery has been thought to conflict with the defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination.
See Blumenson, Constitutional Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
123, 138-57 (1983) (discussing limitations on prosecutorial discovery). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court of the United States has opened the door to prosecutorial discovery. See, e.g. United States
v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Proposition 115's reciprocal discovery provision is likely to comply
with the Supreme Court of the United States' constitutional requirements. See infra notes 186-197
and accompanying text.
99. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.7 (enacted by Proposition 115).
100. Criminal discovery is not permitted except as provided by Chapter 10, other legislation, or
as required by the United States Constitution. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054(e) (enacted by Proposition
115).
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The prosecution must provide the defense with the names and
addresses of all prosecution witnesses.' Additionally, the
prosecution must disclose the statements of all defendants, real
evidence, evidence of prior felony convictions that are to be used
to impeach a material defense witness, exculpatory evidence,
10 2
or the results of specifically enumerated tests or experiments.'03
The defense is required to disclose the names and address of all
defense witnesses, and any statements or reports of those
witnesses."° Furthermore, the defense is required to disclose real
evidence that will be offered in evidence at trial.'0 5
Under Proposition 115, both the prosecution and the defense
retain a privilege against disclosing attorney work product.'
06
Additionally, discovery orders in criminal cases must be authorized
as provided by Chapter 10.'07 Specific procedures must be
complied with in order to obtain discoverable information. First,
the party seeking discovery must informally request the opposing
counsel for the desired information. 108 If the information is not
provided within fifteen days of this request, a court order
compelling discovery may be sought."° Upon a showing that the
requesting party has complied with the discovery procedures, and
that the information sought has not been released within the
applicable time period, the court may issue any order it deems
101. Id. § 1054.1(a) (enacted by Proposition 115). However, the prosecutor may not disclose the
name and address of a victim unless the court, upon a showing of good cause, permits disclosure.
Id. § 1054.2 (enacted by Proposition 115).
102. Suppression of exculpatory evidence violates due process of law if the evidence is relevant
to guilt or sentencing, even if the prosecutor did not act in bad faith when he or she failed to reveal
the evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
103. Id. § 1054.1(b)-( (enacted by Proposition 115).
104. Id. § 1054.3(a) (enacted by Proposition 115). The reports may include the results of mental
of physical examinations. Id.
105. Id. § 1054.3(b) (enacted by Proposition 115).
106. Id. § 1054.6.
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5(a) (enacted by Proposition 115). Additionally, § 1054.5(a)
specifically provides that Chapter 10 is the only means whereby a defendant can compel disclosure
of information from prosecutors, law enforcement officers, or agencies employed by prosecutors or
law enforcement officers that are assisting in them in the performance of their duties. Id.
108. Id. § 1054.5(b) (enacted by Proposition 115).
109. Id.
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necessary to enforce the discovery provisions.11 ° However, the
court cannot prohibit the testimony of a witness from being
introduced as a punishment for a discovery violation unless all
other sanctions have been exhausted."' Furthermore, the court
may not dismiss a charge in response to a discovery violation
unless otherwise required to do so by the United States
Constitution." 2 Disclosures must be made at least thirty days
prior to trial unless there is good cause1 for the delay, refusal,
or restriction of the information sought to be disclosed.'
Information that is obtained within thirty days of trial shall be
disclosed immediately upon request unless there is good cause for
withholding the information, or delaying or limiting its release."1 5
If a party requests, the showing of good cause may be made in
camera.
116
J. Joinder and Severance of Trials and Defendants
Existing law permits the prosecution to join two or more
offenses in the accusatory pleading if the commission of the
offenses is connected. 7 Additionally, the prosecution may state
two or more offenses of the same class together in the accusatory
pleading, and the court may consolidate separate accusatory
110. Id. These orders include, but are not limited to, ordering immediate disclosure, holding the
recalcitrant party in contempt of court, delaying or prohibiting the introduction of evidence, and
continuance of the case. Id. Additionally, the jury may be informed of the failure to disclose or of
an untimely disclosure. Id.
111. Id. § 1054.5(c) (enacted by Proposition 115).
112. Id.
113. For purposes of this section, good cause is specifically limited to threats or possible danger
to the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise
of other law enforcement investigations. Id. § 1054.7 (enacted by Proposition 115).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Verbatim transcripts must be made of the in camera proceeding. Id. If a court orders
relief following such a hearing this record is to be sealed and preserved, although the record is
available to an appellate court and may be opened by the trial court in its discretion following a trial
and conviction. Id.
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985). Cf. FED. R. CRim. P. 8(a) (offenses may be joined
if they are of the same or similar character, are based upon the same conduct, or are part of a
common scheme or plan).
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pleadings." 8 Furthermore, the court may order the joined offenses
to be tried separately.119  Existing case law also provides that
severance of a trial may be required even if the statutory
requirements for joinder are present, if the defendant can clearly
establish that prejudice would result from the joinder of the
offenses.12 Prior case law established a two-part test for
determining whether prejudice warranted the severance of a
trial.' First, if the evidence relating to both charges is cross-
admissible" 2 the claim of substantial prejudice is ordinarily
negated. 3 Second, if the evidence is not cross-admissible, then
the benefits of joinder are balanced against the possible prejudice
to the defendant to determine if severance is warranted,
notwithstanding the fact that the charges are otherwise properly
joined." Proposition 115 states that in situations where two or
more offenses have been joined together in the accusatory pleading,
cross-admissibility of the evidence is not a requirement for a joint
trial."n Additionally, Proposition 115 states that the California
Constitution may not be construed so as to prohibit the joinder of
criminal cases.
126
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1988).
119. Id. The court may sever the offenses in the interests of justice when good cause is shown.
Id. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 (the court may order separate trials, a severance of defendants, or make
other provisions as justice requires if it appears that the joinder of offenses or defendants if either the
government or the defendant is prejudiced by such joinder).
120. People v. Poon, 125 Cal. App. 3d 55, 69, 178 Cal. Rptr. 375, 383-84 (1981). The party
requesting severance has the burden of proving prejudice. Id. at 69, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 384. Cf. FED.
R. Clm. P. 14, supra note 118 (similar standard).
121. Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 448-52, 683 P.2d 699, 702-05, 204 Cal. Rptr
700, 703-06 (1984).
122. In the context of joined trials, cross-admissible evidence is evidence pertinent to one case
which is admissible under the rules of evidence in the other case. Id. at 448, 683 P.2d at 703, 204
Cal. Rptr. at 704.
123. Id.
124. Williams v. Superior Court at 451, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 706, 683 P.2d at 705.
125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954.1 (enacted by Proposition 115).
126. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(a) (enacted by Proposition 115). This is apparently in response to
dicta in the Williams v. Superior Court case in which the court said that due process requires that a
motion for severance be granted upon a showing that joinder will result in substantial prejudice to
the defendant. Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d at 452, 683 P.2d at 706,204 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
For a discussion of Penal Code section 954 and the cases arising under it, see Comment, Prejudicial
Joinder Under California Penal Code Section 954: Judicial Economy at a Premium, 20 PAC. LJ.
1235 (1989).
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Existing law permits defendants in a criminal trial to be
joined. 27 Proposition 115 provides that in any case where
defendants are joined, and a continuance is granted for one of the
defendants, the prosecutor may make a motion to continue the
remaining defendants' cases so that joinder may be
maintained.128 The judge or magistrate is prohibited from
severing defendants due to the unavailability or unpreparedness of
one or more of the defendants unless it appears that it will be





Proposition 115 was enacted to counteract what were perceived
as unfair advantages enjoyed by criminal defendants, align
California's criminal justice system with federal requirements, and
reform California's criminal justice system. 3 ° On December 28,
1990, the California Supreme Court, in the case of Raven v.
Deukmejian," addressed two challenges to Proposition 115. The
court held that Proposition 115 did not violate the California
constitution's "single subject rule;" however, the court struck
down a provision limiting the rights of criminal defendants as a
127. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 954, 1098 (West 1985) (allowing multiple offenses to be joined on
an accusatory pleading); 1098 (West 1985) (requiring consolidated trial of defendants charged
together unless the court orders otherwise) Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) (defendants may be joined if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or offense). The Supreme Court has said that
joinder of defendants is subject to the discretion of the trial judge. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S.
583, 585 (1919).
128. CAL PENAL CODE § 1050.1 (enacted by Proposition 115). The continuance as to the first
defendant constitutes the good cause required to be shown for granting the continuance as to the
second defendant. Id.
129. Id.
130. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, JUNE 1990 BALLoT. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSrrONS, at 50.
131. 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
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constitutional revision that could not be accomplished by a voter
initiative.1
2
Proposition 115 may also be subject to challenge on other
grounds. Specifically, its provisions relating to the use of hearsay
testimony may violate the confrontation clause of the United States
Constitution. The reciprocal discovery requirement, as applied to
specific situations, may violate a defendant's right to be free from
compulsory self-incrimination.'
B. The Single Subject Rule
The California Constitution provides that an initiative measure
which covers more than one subject may not be placed on the
ballot or have any effect."3 The purpose of the single subject
rule, as applied to the initiative process, is to avoid confusing
voters as to the true effect and purpose of an initiative. 35
Proposition 115 was challenged on the theory that its numerous
provisions encompass more than one subject.'36 The California
Supreme Court rejected this argument. 37
In arriving at its decision, the court relied on the case of
Brosnahan v. Brown,138 in which the court rejected a single
subject challenge to Proposition 8, another criminal justice initiative
enacted in 1982.139 Brosnahan stated that an initiative measure
covers a "single subject" if all of its provisions are reasonably
germane to each other." ° Proposition 8 concerned a single
132. Id. at 334, 338. The court also reviewed a number of Proposition 115's provisions, but said
that its review of these provisions was not binding and did not preclude further litigation concerning
these provisions. Id. at 329-31.
133. See infra notes 186-197 and accompanying text.
134. Cal. Const. art. II, § 8(a) (West 1983). A similar statute prohibits the California Legislature
from enacting a statute which covers more than one subject, Id. art. IV, § 9 (West 1983).
135. See Comment, The California Initiative Process: The Demise of the Single-Subject Rule,
14 PAC. UJ. 1095, 1097-98 (1983). Additionally, as applied to the legislative process, the single-
subject rule is designed to prevent the abuses that occur through the use of "riders" to bills and
"logrolling." Id. at 1096-98. See infra note 145 for a discussion of logrolling.
136. See Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 331-34.
137. Id. at 334.
138. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
139. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr at 331-32.
140. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 245, 651 P.2d at 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
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subject because all of its provisions reflected a common concern
with the rights of actual or potential crime victims.' The
Brosnahan court rejected the argument that the provisions of an
initiative must be interdependent in order to pertain to the same
subject, noting that "The legislature may insert in a single act all
legislation germane to the general subject as expressed in its title
and within the field of legislation suggested thereby." 1
42
In Raven, as in Brosnahan, the court held that Proposition 115's
provisions related to the single subject of the protection of the
rights of actual or potential crime victims.143 The court also
acknowledged that a "subsidiary, unifying, theme" of voter
dissatisfaction with state supreme court decisions that were
perceived as unnecessarily expanding the rights of criminal
defendants also existed.'" Additionally, the court rejected the
argument that the possibility that "logrolling" 1 45 played a part
in Proposition 115's passage was a sufficient reason to strike down
its provisions, noting that the risk of logrolling is inherent in the
passage of most laws.1 46 Finally, the court did not accept the
contention that Proposition 115 was unreasonably complex and
confusing to the electorate. 47 The court reasoned that the ballot
proposition was accompanied by both supporting and opposing
arguments, and an analysis of its provisions by the Legislative
Analyst.
1 48
141. Id. at 247, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
142. Id. at 248, 651 P.2d at 281-82, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38 (citing Evans v. Superior Court, 215
Cal. 58, 62-63, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (1932)).
143. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
144. Id. However, the court noted that an initiative which addressed unrelated subjects could not
be saved from a single subject challenge simply because of public dissatisfaction with court decisions
concerning those unrelated subjects. Id.
145. Logrolling is the practice of including several provisions in a single piece of legislation,
many or all of which could not obtain a majority vote on their own, in order to obtain a coalition of
minority votes that will ensure passage of the entire piece of legislation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
849 (5th ed. 1979). See Note, Enforcing the One Subject Rule: The Case For a Subject Veto, 38
HAsTNGs W4. 563, 563-68 (1987) (discussing the practice of logrolling, and noting that single
subject rules were enacted to prevent logrolling).
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The court's decisions in cases presenting a single subject
challenge lead to the conclusion that a legislation's length and
complexity are irrelevant in determining whether the single subject
rule has been violated. 49 Instead, if the changes made concern a
single broad topic, the "reasonably germane" test will have been
complied with.15
C. Constitutional Revision
In California, civil rights are not limited by the United States
Supreme Court interpretation of the federal Constitution.'
Proposition 115's text, as approved by the voters, contained a
provision eliminating this protection for criminal defendants; the
rights of criminal defendants under the California Constitution were
to be no greater than those afforded by the United States
Constitution.'52 This provision of Proposition 115 was invalidated
by the California Supreme Court in Raven.
153
The court held that this provision violates the California
constitutional requirement that either a constitutional convention be
convened, or the legislature submit a proposed constitutional
revision to the voters, in order to revise the constitution.'54
Reasoning that, while the quantitative effect of the invalidated
provision was small, the systemic effect of this single provision
was so extensive as to amount to a revision.'55 More specifically,
the court found that under this provision the California judiciary
would be severely restricted in its interpretation of the rights of
149. Proposition 115 creates changes in the California Constitution, Penal Code, Civil Procedure
Code, and Evidence Code. Proposition 115. Thirty-three statutes are repealed, enacted, or amended.
Id.
150. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
151. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
152. Proposition 115, § 24. Additionally, the text, as approved by the voters, offered no greater
protection to defendants in juvenile proceedings than required by the United States Constitution. Id.
153. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
154. Id. at 334-38. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § I (the legislature may submit a revision of the
state Constitution to the voters if it approves the revision by a vote of two-thirds of both houses of
the legislature); Id. art. XVIII, § 2 (California Constitution may be revised by popular ratification
after convening a constitutional convention).
155. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
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criminal defendants, and in fact the authority to interpret the rights
of criminal defendants would, in effect, be delegated to the United
States Supreme Court.
156
California courts have often asserted their authority to interpret
California constitutional protections more broadly than the identical
provisions in the federal Constitution have been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 157  Had this provision of
Proposition 115 been upheld, several decisions not specifically
addressed in Proposition 115 that afforded broader protection to
criminal defendants in California than is required by the federal
Constitution would have been invalidated.158
Opponents of Proposition 115 had argued that this provision
would have jeopardized a woman's right to an abortion. Acting on
the assumption that Roe v. Wade 59 would be overturned,
opponents of Proposition 115 envisioned the subsequent
criminalization of abortion in California.16° In their view,
156. Id. at 336-37.
157. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111-15, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 327-31 (1975). Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged
a state's right to grant greater protections than those required by the federal constitution. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,62 (1967); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Commission, 379 U.S.
487, 494 (1965). See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of lndividual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489 (arguing that state courts should interpret their constitutions to afford defendants
greater protections than the United States Constitution requires).
158. Compare People v. Drisbow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113,545 P.2d 272,280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360,
368 (1976) (California Constitution prohibits evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation
from being admissible under any circumstances) with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26
(1971) (evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation admissible to impeach the defendant).
Compare People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528,544-45, 531 P.2d 1099,1109-10,119 Cal. Rptr. 315,
325-26 (1975) (arrest itself will not ordinarily justify a warrantless search of an arrestee; if the
suspect is to be transferred in a police vehicle, a pat-down search is authorized, but the police must
have specifically articulable facts in order to conduct a more intrusive search); and People v. Norman,
14 Cal. 3d 929, 938-39, 538 P.2d 237, 244-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 116-17 (1975) (following
Brisendine) with United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (warrant not required to
commence a full search of the person if the search is conducted incident to a lawful custodial arrest;
such a search is a reasonable search under the fourth amendment).
159. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe established that the state may not restrict abortions during the first
trimester of a woman's pregnancy. Id. at 164. Roe was significantly limited in the later case of
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989) and many observers believe that this
is a signal that the Supreme Court is ready to overturn Roe by permitting the states to criminalize
most abortions if they choose to do so.
160. JoINT HEAIG, part 1, at 5.
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California's constitutional right to privacy"" would not protect a
woman's right to obtain an abortion from criminal prohibition
because the overturning of Roe would mean a reversal of Roe's
holding that the federal constitution's right to privacy included the
right of a woman to unrestricted access to abortion in the first
trimester."'
Proposition 115 provided that if the initiative or any application
of it were found to be invalid, the invalid provision was severable
from the rest of the Act so long as the remaining provisions could
be given effect without the invalid provision or application.'
Although the court invalidated the provision limiting defendant's
rights, the court found that it was severable from the other
provisions of Proposition 1 15 ." Thus, the rest of Proposition
115 remains presently effective, notwithstanding the court's refusal
to sustain the limitation on defendant's rights. 65
D. Hearsay Testimony & Preliminary Hearing Procedures
The admission of hearsay testimony at preliminary hearings, and
the inability of a defendant to cross-examine a qualified law
enforcement officer's hearsay testimony at the hearing present
possible confrontation clause violations." These issues were
considered by the California Court of Appeal in Nollins v. Superior
Court.
16 7
In NoUins, the court determined that the federal Constitution did
not prohibit the introduction of hearsay testimony at the
preliminary hearing.1 6' The court also concluded that inability of
the defendant to cross-examine the police officer at the preliminary
161. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 1 (West 1983).
162. JoINT HEARiNa, part 1, at 21. For a discussion of the Webster case, the current status of
abortion rights in the United States, and arguments supporting and opposing the Webster decision,
see Colloquy: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83 (1990).
163. Proposition 115, § 29.
164. Raven, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 338-39 (1990).
165. Id.
166. See U.S. CoNsr., amend. VI (confrontation requirement).
167. 224 Cal. App. 3d 1171, 274 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1990).
168. Id. at 1186, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 495-500.
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hearing was not a violation of the confrontation clause." o The
court based these holdings on its conclusion that the sixth
amendment's confrontation clause was not applicable to a
preliminary hearing. 7 Furthermore, the court concluded that no
California Supreme Court decision had held that the federal
Constitution prohibited hearsay and denial of cross-examination at
a preliminary hearing.171 However, the Nollins decision, read in
light of other Supreme Court of the United States decisions, might
be challenged by a defendant.
The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that
there is no constitutional due process right to a preliminary
hearing. 72 However, the Supreme Court has also held that a
preliminary hearing is a "critical stage" entitling a defendant to an
attorney. 73 The Court reasoned that an attorney was necessary to
protect the defendant against an improper prosecution. 74
Specifically, the court noted that "the lawyer's skillful examination
and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses
in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind
the accused over." 75
An effective analogy might be made by the defendant between
the right to counsel and the right to confrontation. Just as a
defendant is constitutionally entitled to a lawyer at a preliminary
hearing even though the Constitution does not require the hearing,
equal protection mandates that the defendant retain his or her right
to confrontation at the hearing once the state chooses to use that
procedure. Other comparisons are possible. The Supreme Court of
the United States has also held that equal protection requires that
169. Id. at 1184-86, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
170. Id. at 1182-86, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 495-98. The Nollins court focused its attention primarily
on federal constitutional law because, at the time of the decision, the provision of Proposition 115
that stated that the rights of a criminal defendant were no greater than those afforded by the United
States Constitution had not yet been invalidated in Raven. See supra notes 151-165 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this provision.
171. Nollins, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 1188-91, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 500-02.
172. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 589-90 (1913).
173. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
174. Id. at 9.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
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a defendant be afforded counsel on his or her first appeal as of
right, even though the state is not obligated to provide the
defendant with an appeal.1 76  Similar analogies can be made
between the right to have a lawyer at a defendant's first appeal as
of right and the right to confrontation at a preliminary hearing.
Proponents of these provisions may argue that Supreme Court
cases pertaining to hearsay and the confrontation clause have all
spoken of the right to confrontation as one that is applicable at
trial. The Nollins court relied on this rationale in arriving at its
decision.'" However, this merely reflects that fact that the
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether the
right to confrontation exists at a preliminary hearing; Nollins itself
acknowledged this situation. 178 Nevertheless, given the increasing
conservatism of the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the Court
will extend civil rights any further than required by the wording of
the Constitution or the Court's previous decisions. 179 In this case,
the fact that the Supreme Court has spoken of the right to
confrontation as a right which is applicable mainly at trial makes
it especially unlikely that a defendant can challenge the hearsay
provisions of Proposition 115 as a violation of the confrontation
clause.
°80
Of course, if a defendant has the ability to cross-examine the
hearsay declarant at trial, it follows that the confrontation clause
has been satisfied. The Nollins court relied on the defendant's
176. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963).
177. Nolns, 224 Cal. App.3d at 1182-84, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 495-97.
178. Id. at 1185, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
179. See, e.g., Bowers v. Harwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (no fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy when such right is not a part of the nation's history and is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution). The Bowers court specifically mentioned that they were unwilling to
recognize new fundamental rights that were not mentioned in the text of the Constitution and that
were not part of the country's historical tradition. Id. at 194-95. But cf. Minnick v. Mississippi, II1
S.Ct. 486, 491 (1990) (Supreme Court extended the protection of a criminal defendant to have
counsel present at a custodial interrogation; the police are prohibited from interrogating a defendant
who has requested a lawyer at any time after the request unless the lawyer is present).
180. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (right to confrontation is for the
purpose of promoting reliability in a criminal trial); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987)
(right to confrontation is a trial right); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (the purpose of the
confrontation clause is to assure that the trier of fact in a criminal trial resolves the factual issues
accurately).
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ability to cross-examine the state's witness as support for the
court's holding that the defendant's confrontation rights had not
been violated. However, current California Evidence Code
sections along with the hearsay provisions of Proposition 115 may
often put the prosecutor to a difficult choice; since the defendant
retains the right to confrontation at trial, a prosecutor may be
forced to choose between using the law enforcement officer's
hearsay testimony at the trial or at the preliminary hearing.
A hypothetical case illustrates this point. Assume that a witness,
W, sees D commit larceny. W immediately reports D's activities
to the police. D is charged with larceny. At D's preliminary
hearing, a police officer offers W's hearsay statement. On the basis
of this hearsay testimony, the magistrate finds that there is
probable cause to believe that D has committed larceny, and binds
D over for trial. W is unavailable'1 2 to testify at trial. At trial, the
prosecutor calls P as a witness for the purpose of getting P's
testimony about W's statement to him.
In this situation, the prosecutor would be precluded from
offering a transcript of P's testimony at the preliminary hearing.
Former testimony offered against a person who was a party to a
prior proceeding must, among other things, have been subject to
adequate cross-examination at the prior proceeding."' Thus,
while the prosecutor could have introduced the hearsay at trial had
it been subject to cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, in
this situation he or she will be unable to do both. The prosecutor
must choose between offering the evidence at the preliminary
hearing or offering the evidence at trial because current Supreme
Court jurisprudence still requires that the defendant have a chance
to confront an adverse witness at some point in the
181. Nolns, 224 Cal. App.3d at 1184-85, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
182. See id. § 240 (West Supp. 1991) (definition of "'unavailability of a witness").
183. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291 (West 1966). Both the transcript of P's testimony and W's
statements are considered hearsay, but multiple hearsay is admissible as long as each statement fits
within one of the hearsay exceptions. Id. § 1201 (West Supp. 1991).
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proceedings.18' It is immaterial that D will be able to cross-
examine the police officer, since he is merely repeating what X
told him."8 5
E. Reciprocal Discovery
Proposition 115 amends the California Constitution by declaring
that discovery in criminal trials shall be reciprocal.186
Traditionally, prosecutorial discovery has been restricted. 8 7 The
Supreme Court has imposed specific restrictions on the
prosecution's discovery process in criminal cases. For instance,
notice of alibi statutes, which require a defendant to inform the
prosecution that he or she intends to assert the defense of alibi, are
unconstitutional unless the defendant is entitled to reciprocal
discovery rights from the prosecution. 8
Nonetheless, the Court has also held that the defendant's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does not totally
restrict the prosecutor from discovering information to be used at
trial. For example, in United States v. Noblest"9 the Court held
184. See, e.g. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (confrontation clause not violated by the
introduction of hearsay if the declarant is also a witness and subject to cross-examination); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (right to confrontation supersedes state's interest in protecting juvenile
offenders; conviction reversed when defense was precluded from effectively cross-examining the
juvenile).
185. Hearsay evidence must have sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be admissible in a criminal
case where the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980). If the hearsay falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, reliability can be presumed
without further evidence. Id. Proposition 115's requirement that the law enforcement officer giving
the hearsay testimony fulfill certain requirements improves the reliability of the officer, not the
declarant. Although the lack of opportunity to cross-examine does not impair admissibility, a
defendant might successfully contend that the statement does not meet the Roberts requirement that
the statement falls within one of the established hearsay exceptions.
186. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(c) (enacted by Proposition 115).
187. See Blumenson, ConstitudonalLimitations on Prosecutorial Discovery, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 123 (1983) for a general discussion of prosecutorial discovery.
188. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973). Specifically, reciprocal discovery in this
instance means that the defendant is given the opportunity to discover the witnesses that the state
intends to introduce to rebut the defendant's alibi defense. Id. As the Court said, "The State may not
insist that trials be runs as a 'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while
maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses." Id. at 475. See also Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecution required to reveal exculpatory evidence).
189. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
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that the fifth amendment privilege does not extend to the
statements of third parties whom the defendant intends to call as
witnesses at the trial."9  The Court reasoned the privilege was
personal to the defendant, and thus does not cover third parties.19'
The Court expressly rejected the proposition that criminal discovery
is "basically a one-way street.""
The Court has also been willing to uphold sanctions on criminal
defendants who do not comply with the state's discovery requests.
In Taylor v. Illinois,193 the Court concluded that the preclusion of
the testimony of a defense witness as a result of the defendant's
failure to disclose the witness' name was not absolutely prohibited
by the sixth amendment's compulsory process clause."94 The
Court stated that the public interest, specifically the public's
interest in the integrity of the adversarial process and fair trials,
were factors to be balanced against the defendant's right to offer
favorable testimony. 95
Given these decisions, the provision of Proposition 115
mandating reciprocal discovery is unlikely to beheld invalid per se.
Furthermore, the newly enacted Penal Code provisions mandating
that the defendant release the names of, and information
concerning, third parties 196 are permissible under Nobles. Finally,
the requirement that the defendant disclose real evidence that he or
she intends to offer at trial 97 does not, on its face, require that
the defendant disclose personal information within the meaning of
Nobles. Therefore, a defendant challenging Proposition 115's
discovery provisions will be limited to an "as applied" attack.
Deborah Glynn
190. Id. at 234.
191. id.
192. Id. at 233.
193. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
194. Id. at 410-418.
195. Id. at 414-15. For a discussion of the Taylor decision, see Note, Taylor v. Illinois: Supreme
Court Approves Preclusion of Defense Wimesses for Discovery Violation, 25 SAN DEMO L REV.
1113 (1988).
196. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
197. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3(b) (enacted by Proposition 115).
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